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L Introduction
Broker-dealer liability to customers frequently is analyzed under the
"shingle theory," whereby it is presumed that a broker-dealer that hangs out
a shingle and solicits customers makes an implied representation of fair
dealing.' Although breach of this representation has resulted in liability
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, the shingle
* Roberta S. Karmel, B.A., Radcliffe, 1959, LL.B., New York University, 1962, is
a Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of International Business
Law, Brooklyn Law School. She is also Of Counsel to Kelley Drye & Warren and was a
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1977-80. A research stipend
from Brooklyn Law School was helpful in the preparation of this article. The research
assistance of Brooklyn Law School student Peter Sack is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcURITIES REGULATION 879
(3d ed. 1995).
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theory also can be justified by the obligation to adhere to just and equitable
principles of trade under the rules of the securities industry's self-regulatory
organizations. Part II of this article will discuss the development of the
shingle theory and its variations.2
After years of expanding the parameters of the antifraud provisions, the
United States Supreme Court in 1975 began cutting back on liability under
the antifraud provisions. This retrenchment has accelerated m recent terms,
under both the implied and express liability provisions. Nevertheless, in
cases involving regulated entities such as securities firms, the Court has not
shown the same enthusiasm for eliminating liability for broker-dealers as for
other types of defendants. Part III of this article will analyze the Supreme
Court cases interpreting the antifraud provisions, emphasizing the require-
ments for scienter and a duty to speak under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and explaining the limits the Court
has put on the use of other statutory sections for implying private rights of
action.3 Part IV of this article then will speculate concerning the continuing
viability of the shingle theory under Sections 17(a) and 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act, as
well as under the controlling person provisions of both statutes.4
Recent Supreme Court case law has cast considerable doubt on cus-
tomers' ability to use the antifraud provisions to impose liability on broker-
dealers. Ironically, however, most suits instituted by customers against
broker-dealers now are prosecuted in securities industry self-regulatory
arbitrations in which breach of just and equitable principles of trade can be
the basis for recovery Accordingly, the question has rarely arisen as to
whether or to what extent Supreme Court cases have undermined the theoret-
ical underpinnings for the shingle theory Furthermore, while this article is
being written, securities reform legislation is pending and may create an
express right of action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act that may
change the law in this area. Part V of this article will trace the developments
pushing most customer-broker litigation into arbitration and will discuss the
implications of proposed securities legislation.'
The author's conclusion, explicated in Part VI of this article and based
upon the logical conclusion of Supreme Court antifraud doctrine, is that the
shingle theory is no longer a sound basis for civil liability to private parties
2. See infra pp. 1273-80.
3. See infra pp. 1280-89.
4. See infra pp. 1290-93.
5. See infra pp. 1293-95.
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under the antifraud provisions. Nevertheless, the Court may retreat from
this conclusion because of its general policy view that the purpose of the
federal securities laws is to police the securities industry 6
II. The Shingle Theory
A. Generally
A broker-dealer does not have the same relationship to all of its cus-
tomers. If a firm exercises actual or de facto control over a customer's
account because of a customer's trust and confidence, the broker may owe
a fiduciary obligation to the customer.7 In many situations, a broker-dealer
deals with its customers at arm's length, and a fiduciary relationship may not
exist. Some older cases stated, however, that broker-dealers impliedly
represent that they will deal fairly with their customers, and, therefore,
unfair dealing is a breach of this implied representation and a violation of the
antifraud provisions.' This implied representation arises from the mere act
of hanging up a shingle and going into business as a broker-dealer, and,
therefore, it is known as the "shingle theory "'
Tis theory was developed in admnimstrative proceedings brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against broker-dealers and then
was affirmed by the courts. Accordingly, there was no question of liability
in damages to customers who were defrauded. Charges brought by the SEC
included violations of Sections 17(a) of the Securities Act,1" 10(b) of the Ex-
6. See infra pp. 1295-97
7 See Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974-76 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (noting broker's duty
of disclosure); In re Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 896 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d
228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
8. See, e.g., Kahn v SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring)
(noting implied warranty m shingle theory cases); Charles Hughes & Co. v SEC, 139 F.2d
434, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); In re United Sec. Corp., 15
S.E.C. 719, 727 (1944).
9. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 879.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they. were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
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change Act" and Rule lOb-5 thereunder, and 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act 2
and Rule 15cl-2 thereunder. The courts felt that the SEC's theories went
beyond the common law, but considered the business of selling securities
peculiarly n need of regulation for the protection of investors and further
believed that Congress had given the SEC the authority to so regulate
broker-dealers. 3
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange -
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate m the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)-(2) (1988),which provides:
(1)(A) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial
paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national
securities exchange of which it is a member by means of any manipulative, decep-
tive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance, [and] (B) no municipal securities
dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the pur-
chase or sale of, any municipal security by means of any manipulative, deceptive,
or other fraudulent device or contrivance. (D) The Commission shall, for the
purposes of this paragraph, by rules and regulations define such devices or con-
trivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
(2)(A) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or mstru-
mentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction m, or to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted
security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) other-
wise than on a national securities exchange of which it is a member, in connection
with which such broker or dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive, or mani-
pulative act or practice, or makes any fictitious quotation, [and] (B) no municipal
securities dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce
the purchase or sale of, any municipal security in connection with which such
municipal securities dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
act or practice, or makes any fictitious quotation. (D) The Commission shall,
for the purposes of this paragraph, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative and such quotations as are fictitious.
13. See Hughes v SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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The notion that the SEC created the shingle theory pursuant to its
statutory authority to regulate broker-dealers and, m doing so, went beyond
common-law principles may not be valid, however. The federal securities
laws as they apply to broker-dealers are based upon a complicated scheme
of audited self-regulation by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE),
other national stock exchanges, the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), and other self-regulatory organizations (SROs).' 4 These
SROs impose a variety of obligations upon broker-dealers under the rubric
of just and equitable principles of trade 5 or rules of fair practice. 16 Such
standards of fair dealing are industry principles of custom and usage that
form the basis of common-law duties. 7 The shingle theory is based upon
these industry standards of fair dealing to a greater extent than upon any
SEC regulation, although over the years the SEC has encapsulated certain
fair dealing obligations into its rules.
B. Vanations
The shingle theory is not based upon the law of agency because a
broker-dealer may act as either agent or principal. Indeed, a securities firm
is required to disclose to customers the capacity in which it is acting."8 But
in dealing with customers, the broker-dealer necessarily has superior
knowledge about certain matters. The essence of the shingle theory is a
prohibition against overreaching or taking unfair advantage of this superior
knowledge. Very inportantly, the broker-dealer has knowledge of current
14. Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regula-
tory Technque, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171,203-07 (1995); Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Indus-
try Self-Regulation - Tested By the Crash, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1297, 1297-99 (1988).
15. Under NYSE Rule 476(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2476 (1995), the NYSE can
discipline a member, member organization, allied member or member organization, or person
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Exchange who is adjudged guilty, among other
things, of violations of the Exchange Act, the consitution or rules of the NYSE, any agree-
ments with the NYSE, "fraud or fraudulent acts," or "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade."
16. Article li, § 1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) 2151
(1995), provides that "[a] member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." The NASD's
Rules of Fair Practice further set forth various components of the shingle theory including
suitable recommendations to customers and a 5% markup policy. Article I, §§ 2, 4, NASD
Rule of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCII) 2152, 2154 (1995).
17 Cf. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.6 (2d ed.
1990).
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1995).
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market prices of securities traded. Accordingly, an important aspect of the
shingle theory is that a broker-dealer makes an implied representation that
prices charged to customers will bear a reasonable relationship to current
market prices.'9 This also may be expressed as a duty to charge fair prices.'
This duty to deal fairly has numerous variations that can be expressed
as implied representations or duties. Because a broker-dealer impliedly
represents that he will execute only authorized transactions, effecting unauth-
orized transactions is a breach of duty 21 Because a broker-dealer impliedly
represents that transactions will be consummated promptly, it is a breach of
duty to use customer funds for other purposes.' Because a broker-dealer
impliedly represents that he has a reasonable basis for investment recommen-
dations, it is a breach of duty to fail to investigate the securities that he
recommends for sale.'
These and similar obligations have been formulated into rules by the
SEC pursuant to either Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Section 15(c)
of the Exchange Act - the general antifraud provision specifically applicable
to broker-dealers.' Two additional theories of broker-dealer liability to
customers deserve special mention because they are the basis of many civil
damage cases as well as SEC and SRO disciplinary proceedings. These
theories are suitability and churning. Often, both theories are raised in the
same case, and it is often unclear whether liability is predicated upon the
shingle theory or breach of fiduciary duty
SRO rules include obligations to "know your customer" and make
investment recommendations that are suitable to each customer's financial
circumstances and needs.' This precept may have originated in SRO efforts
to protect member firms rather than customers, but it is now a clear ethical
standard for the protection of investors.' Whether this standard has been
19. i re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 389 (1939); see Article m, § 4, NASD Rules
of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2154 (1995).
20. SEC v First Jersey Sec., Inc., 890 F Supp. 1185, 1196 (S.D.N.Y 1995).
21. Eichler v SEC, 757 F.2d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1985).
22. Similarly, doing business while insolvent is a violation of the shingle theory SEC
v C.H. Abraham & Co., 186 F Supp. 19, 21 (S.D.N.Y 1960).
23. Hardy v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1969); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,365, at
88,728 (1977).
24. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-10, 15cl-1 to 15ci-9, 15c2-1 to 15c2-12 (1995).
25. NYSE Rule 405, 2 NYSE Guide 2405 (1994); Article m, § 2(a), NASD Rules
of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCII) 2152 (1995).
26. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 898-901.
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raised to the level of a principle of law depends upon whether the. obligation
to make suitable recommendations is a duty that has been incorporated by the
antifraud provisions' or whether a customer can claim that unsuitable
recommendations were tantamount to fraud and that all elements of a fraud
action can be factually demonstrated.2
The suitability doctrine can arise in several contexts. 29 The most com-
mon is when a salesperson makes a recommendation to a customer that he
knows or should know would be unsuitable for that customer's financial
circumstances and needs. Another context is when a broker-dealer does not
make an affirmative recommendation, but nevertheless sells the customer an
unsuitable security In both of these circumstances, the broker-dealer may
not have made any misrepresentations to the customer, so there is a question
of whether the securities salesperson or firm had a duty to investigate the
customer's financial situation and then speak out.
In Brown v E.F Hutton Group, Inc. ,' the Second Circuit held that an
unsuitability claim is a subset of the ordinary Section 10(b) fraud claim m
which a plaintiff must allege material misstatements or omissions, indicating
an intent to deceive or defraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security 1 Further, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the securities purchased
were unsuited to the buyer's needs, (2) the defendant knew or reasonably
believed that the securities were so unsuited, (3) the defendant recommended
or purchased the securities anyway, (4) the defendant made material
misrepresentations (or owed a duty to disclose material information) relating
to the suitability of the securities, and (5) the buyer justifiably relied to its
detriment on the defendant's fraudulent conduct.32
In O'Connor v. R.F Lafferty & Co. ,3 the Tenth Circuit sinilarly found
a need for the plaintiff to prove scienter, or at least recklessness, but ana-
27 See Jablon v Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding
no congressional intent to provide private action for violation of stock exchange rules); Clark
v John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1978) (dealing with jury
instruction concerning effect of NASD rule violation on finding of Rule 10b-5 violation);
Buttrey v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141-43 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
28. See Brown v E.F Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993);
O'Connor v R.F Lafferty Co., 965 F 2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1992).
29. See Robert H. Mundheun, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The
Suitability Doctrne, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 448-54 (1965).
30. 991 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1993).
31. See Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031.
32. Id.
33. 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
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lyzed the elements of a claim for unsuitability differently The court viewed
unsuitability as fraud by conduct and therefore similar to churning. It
therefore adopted three elements to establish unsuitability based on fraud by
conduct in a Rule lOb-5 case, namely- The plaintiff must prove that (1) the
broker recommended (or, in the case of a discretionary account, purchased)
securities that are unsuitable in light of the investor's objectives, (2) the
broker recommended or purchased the securities with an intent to defraud or
with reckless disregard for the investor's interests, and (3) the broker
exercised control over the investor's account. 34
Churning is excessive trading in a customer's account, in disregard of
the customer's investment objectives, for the purpose of generating comms-
sions. 35 Unlike suitability, churning long has been considered a violation of
the antifraud provisions.36 Control over the customer's account, either in the
form of a trading power or by reason of the broker-customer relationship,
is necessary 37 Therefore, churning involves a fiduciary relationship and
perhaps does not require any application of the shingle theory to make the
antifraud provisions applicable. Nevertheless, the line demarcating churning
from suitability often is blurred.
The lack of theoretical clarity between the shingle theory and a fiduciary
duty theory is demonstrated by In re E.F Hutton & Co.,38 in which a
customer placed an open limit order in Genex stock at 171/.39 While the
broker-dealer was holding the customer's order, the broker-dealer sold 4,755
shares of Genex from its own inventory at 171 and 171h. Subsequently, the
price declined, and the customer's order was never executed. The SEC held
that the broker-dealer violated its fiduciary duty to the customer by failing
to give his limit order priority over its own proprietary position. The
Comnussion's theory was that when the broker-dealer accepted the linut
order it became the customer's agent, and absent an explicit agreement to the
contrary, an agent is a fiduciary But this theory would transform almost
every transaction between broker-dealers and customers into one governed
by fiduciary duty - a result that goes beyond the shingle theory The
34. O'Connor v R.F Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1992).
35. Mihara v Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1980).
36. Norman S. Poser, Civil Liability for Unsuitable Recommendations, 19 Rev See.
& Comm. Reg. (Standard & Poor's) 67, 67-68 (Apr. 2, 1986).
37 Taylor v Bear Steams & Co., 572 F Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
38. Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,303 (July 6, 1988).
39 In re E.F Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,327 (July 6, 1988).
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dissenting commissioners in this case took issue with this fiduciary duty
analysis. They urged a remand for an inquiry into the facts surrounding this
transaction and whether the dealings between the broker-dealer and customer
were in accord with industry practice - an inquiry that would be more
consonant with the shingle theory
Some of the disagreement over the Hutton case focused on the sophisti-
cation of Hutton's customer. The shingle theory would appear to apply
primarily to unsophisticated customers who fall victim to salespersons who
take unfair advantage of them. Yet, the securities markets are increasingly
institutionalized. This raises a question as to whether the shingle theory is
appropriate m analyzing the relationship between broker-dealers and cus-
tomers m all situations.
Financial regulators and plaintiffs' lawyers apparently believe that the
shingle theory is alive and well, even as to institutional clients. In the
derivatives marketplace, huge losses by supposedly sophisticated corporate
clients, institutions, and municipalities have generated a blizzard of litigation
against banks and broker-dealers, charging lack of suitability and failure to
disclose the risks of derivatives trading, including pricing and valuation
methods40 While none of these suits has been tested at the circuit court or
Supreme Court level, financial regulators required Bankers Trust Co. to
agree to conduct its business in leveraged derivatives transactions (LDTs) in
a manner that seeks to reasonably ensure that each LDT customer has the
capability to understand the nature, material terms, conditions, and risks of
any LDT entered into by the customer.4 Additionally, Bankers Trust Co.
agreed to make sufficient disclosures to customers about LDTs so they could
understand such terms, conditions, and risks, as well as LDT pricing and
valuation.42
This order against Bankers Trust Co. essentially presumes that the bank
had a duty to sell derivatives at fair prices and to at least mquire whether the
derivatives were suitable, although the undertakings by the bank are framed
in terms of disclosure to customers. Although there was some question as
to whether the derivatives involved were securities - the Commodity
40. See generally Dominic Bencivenga, Derivatives Litigation, N.Y L.J., Mar. 16,
1995, at 5; Lauren A. Teigland, Derivatives Disputes and Disappointments: The 'Sad'
Phenomenon of Derivatives Litigation, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 703 (Apr. 3, 1995);
Unsuitable: It Is Wrong to Protect Companies and Professional Investors from the Conse-
quences of Their Own Actions, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 18.
41. Written Agreement Between Bankers Trust and Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 895 (Dec. 12, 1994).
42. Id.
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Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) does not have a suitability rule - the
SEC and CFTC brought similar cases that also were settled. a Regulators
denied that Bankers Trust Co. was being subjected to a new or enhanced
suitability standard, but the derivatives industry has adopted such a new stan-
dard in response to this litigation.' Ironically, the United States Supreme
Court has been moving in a contrary direction, possibly undermining the
legal underpinnings of the shingle theory
III. Key Cases Interpreting the Antifraud Provisions
A. Rule 10b-5 Before 1975
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act contain an elaborate scheme
of remedies for injured mvestors. 4 Nevertheless, an implied right of action
for damages under Rule lOb-5 was first recognized in 1946' and later was
confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1971 with virtually no dis-
cussion. 47 Impatience with specified remedies under the securities laws in
the 1960s and early 1970s led to provisions that led to an expansive recogni-
tion of implied rights of action by the courts. Indeed, by 1977 Professor
Loss observed that
[c]ivil liability has become a jungle as the lush growth of the "implied"
actions - not only under rule lOb-5 but also under the proxy rules, the
tender offer provisions of 1968, the Federal Reserve credit rules and
43. Order Exempting Certain Brokers and Dealers from Broker-Dealer Registration,
Exchange Act Release No. 35,135, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,476, at 86,107 (Dec. 22, 1994); In re BT See. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7,124,
Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,477, at 86,109 (Dec. 2-2, 1994); Steven Lipin & Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers Trust Settles
Charges on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994, at Cl, C22.
44. The SEC Order stated: "This matter does not involve any finding or conclusion
relating to the suitability of the derivative products described herein for Gibson." In re BT
Sec. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7,124, Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, [1994-
1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,477, at 86,109, 86,110 n.2 (Dec. 22,
1994). But see Anne Schwimmer, Legal Eagles Put Pen to Paper to Head Off Derivatives
Suits, INVESTMENT DEALERs' DIG., Dec. 12, 1994, at 7 (noting addenda to swap agreements
that highlight suitability issues); Industry Reps Tell Senate Banking No Derivatives Legislation
Necessary, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 101 (Jan. 16, 1995).
45. See Securities Act, §§ 11, 12(1), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 1(1), 1(2) (1988);
Exchange Act, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, and 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), p(b), r, cc(b) (1988).
46. See Kardon v National Gypsum Co., 69 F Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
47 See Superintendent of Ins. v Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971).
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section 36 of the Investment Company Act - has dwarfed, upstaged,
outshone, and made wide end runs around, the express civil liability
provisions.'
In this environment, it generally was assumed that the antifraud pro-
visions could be interpreted broadly to cover broker-dealer breaches of duty
to a customer under the shingle theory Cases prosecuted by the SEC based
on the shingle theory were affirmed.49 In addition, civil cases for damages
brought by customers against broker-dealers were successful i nnposmg
liability under the shingle theory I
A reversal of this trend began in 1975 with Blue Chip Stamps v
Manor Drug Stores.5 This case affirmed the implication of private rights
under Rule lOb-5, although Justice Rehnquist commented that this was a
judicial oak that has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.' In
Blue Chip Stamps, the Court concluded that a Rule lOb-5 plaintiff must be
a purchaser or seller of securities.53 More important than the holding was
the fact that this was the first Supreme Court decision to interpret Rule 10b-5
restrictively, rather than liberally In addition to interpreting the securities
laws narrowly, the Court based its reading of the Exchange Act on public
policy grounds. The Court viewed implied claims with disfavor and
expressed the opiuon that litigation in fraud cases had a unique propensity
to be vexatious.'
B. The Antifraud Proisions Since 1975
After 1975, the Supreme Court generally read Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act in a way that curtailed litigation pursuant to Rule 10b-5. In
particular, the Court did so in cases involving negligence or fiduciary duties
and in cases where the defendant was not a primary tortfeasor, but rather a
more peripheral actor. Nevertheless, in cases involving broker-dealers, the
Court generally declined to narrow the scope of the antifraud provisions.
48. Louis Loss, Introduction: The Federal Securities Code - Its Purpose, Plan, and
Progress, 30 VAND. L. REv 315, 315 (1977).
49. See Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring) (noting
SEC's reliance on shingle theory m case and companion case); see also Berko v SEC, 297
F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961); Kahn v SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961).
50. Gochnauer v A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir. 1987).
51. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
52. Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
53. Id. at 749-55.
54. Id. at 739.
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In Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder,55 the Court concluded that knowing or
intentional conduct was a required element of a Rule lOb-5 case. In so
deciding, the Court invalidated the third clause of Rule 10b-5 insofar as it
purports to cover fraudulent conduct not committed with scienter, or specific
intent to deceive.56 This case is important to the question of whether the
shingle theory remains viable because it suggests that in customer-broker
litigation the customer must prove scienter.
Whether there can be specific intent to deceive a customer when there
is a breach of an implied representation is an interesting question. It can be
argued that the failure to disclose an intended breach of a fiduciary duty is
a Rule lOb-5 fraud.' However, if a representation of fair dealing is implied
by the law rather than made expressly, how can a tortfeasor have the
requisite intent not to honor that representation? If the scienter requirement
of Rule lOb-5 is met by an extreme departure from ordinary standards of
care, 58 and SRO suitability or other fair dealing precepts are regarded as an
ordinary standard of care, then scienter could be found in an omission to
disclose unfair dealing.
Shingle theory cases seem to be close to cases involving an alleged
breach of fiduciary duty, but in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v Green,59 the
Court declined to read Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act as covering
breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate directors. The Court expressed the
view that such actions were covered by state corporation law and that the
federal securities laws were aimed at preventing deception and manipulation
in the stock markets.' This refusal to use Rule lOb-5 to supplant state
directorial fiduciary duty law was reaffirmed in Schreiber v Burlington
Northern, Inc.,6 in which the Court refused to apply the tender offer rules
to hold as "manipulative" an allegedly abusive defense mechanism utilized
by a target in a tender offer.62 Whether the Court would extend this line of
cases to broker-dealer breaches of fiduciary duty is an open question.
55. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
56. Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
57 See Goldberg v. Mendor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978).
58. See Sundstrand Corp. v Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir.)
(outlining standard of recklessness as sufficient to meet Rule lob-5 requirements), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
59. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
60. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977).
61. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
62. Schreiber v Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985).
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In Chiarella v United States,63 the court overturned a crumnal convic-
tion under Rule 10b-5 against a printer who traded on inside information on
the ground that silence cannot be actionable unless there is a duty to speak
and that the printer owed no general duty to the marketplace.' 4 A broker-
dealer's duty to speak under the shingle theory and to advise a customer that
the firm is overreaching could be distinguished 'from the general duty to
disclose to the marketplace that was rejected m Chiarella.65
In Dirks v SEC,' another insider trading case, the Court declined to
impose a general duty to the marketplace upon a securities industry profes-
sional who obtained information about a massive issuer fraud from a non-
client.67 The Circuit Court had suggested that a securities industry profes-
sional might have disclosure duties by reason of professional status,68 but the
Supreme Court held that fiduciary duty depended upon the existence of a
special confidential or fiduciary relationship.69 In the case of a broker-dealer
and a customer, such a special relationship exists where the customer reposes
trust and confidence in the firm or a particular salesperson. In arm's length
dealer transactions with sophisticated customers, however, the existence of
such a special relationship may be less clear.
It is interesting that in one post-1975 case in which the Court declined
to narrow antifraud liability, Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v Bern-
er,70 fraudulent activity by a broker-dealer was at issue.71 Investors sued a
securities broker who had misrepresented the discovery of gold m Surminam
by an oil and gas company, claiming that this was inside information.' The
Supreme Court rejected a defense of in pan delicto on the grounds that a
private action may be barred only when the plaintiff bears at least equal
responsibility for the violations and when preclusion of the suit would not
interfere significantly with effective enforcement of the securities laws.73
The Court reasoned that insiders and broker-dealers who selectively disclose
63. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
64. Chiarella v United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-37 (1980).
65. Id. at 227-28.
66. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
67 See Dirks v SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665-67 (1983).
68. SeeDirksv SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 841 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646
(1983).
69. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
70. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
71. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 301 (1985).
72. See id. at 301-02.
73. See id. at 310-11.
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material, nonpublic information commt a broader range of violations than
do tippees. Consequently, the public interest will be advanced if the tippees
can bring suit.74 This case does not necessarily indicate that the Court would
impose a fiduciary duty on a broker-dealer's salespersons to customers solely
by virtue of their status as securities professionals. However, in cases
involving such primary targets of securities regulation, the Court has been
less quick to curtail civil liability The Court continued to interpret the
securities laws broadly in Herman & MacLean v Huddeston,7I where it held
that facts giving rise to express civil liability against a public company under
the federal securities laws also could form the basis for a Rule lOb-5 action76
and in Basic Inc. v Levinson,7' where the Court affirmed a broad materiality
standard as against a public company 78 Where defendants have been
secondary tortfeasors, however, the Court has been very reluctant to extend
liability In Central Bank v First Interstate Bank,79 the Court, in a 5-4 split,
held that no private right of action should be implied under Rule 10b-5
against persons who aid and abet a securities fraud.'
It is difficult to extrapolate from these cases a lesson concerning the
continued viability of the shingle theory Since 1975, the Court has inter-
preted Rule lOb-5 narrowly, but it nevertheless views this rule as an impor-
tant public policy tool for policing the public securities markets and
securities industry professionals. Although the Court has declined to impose
a general duty to the marketplace on anyone, when participants in a secun-
ties transaction have a relationship that could give rise to fiduciary duties,
the Court has been willing to use Rule 10b-5 to impose a duty to speak. In
the relationship between a broker-dealer and a customer, a duty to speak
would validate the shingle theory in many cases. However, if the Court
should hold that the relationship between salesperson and customer is a type
of fiduciary relationship best left to state law, it could invalidate the
application of Rule lOb-5 to cases involving overreaching only
The requirement that scienter be proven in any Rule lOb-5 case is a pos-
sible barrier to use of Rule lOb-5 to cover breach of an implied representa-
tion of fair dealing. Yet, it could be argued that the necessary education and
74. See id. at 314 (noting, essentially, that tippee's culpability is substantially equal to
his tippers' culpability).
75. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
76. See Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1983).
77 See 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
78. See Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-32 (1988).
79 See 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
80. See Central Bank v First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1447-48 (1994).
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training that salespersons and other securities industry personnel must have
in order to be employed as securities industry professionals gives them
knowledge of the duty of fair dealing."1 Therefore, the type of overreaching
that has led to liability under the shingle theory in past cases is at least
reckless behavior that has been held to satisfy the scienter requirement in
most circuits.'
C. Implied Claims Under Provisions Other Than Rule 10b-5
One of the Court's stated reasons for curtailing civil liability under
Rule 10b-5 is that claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act have been
implied by the courts, and, therefore, judicial self restraint should be exer-
cised in developing the parameters of such an action. The first securities law
section under which the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied
claim was not Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, but rather was Section
14(a) of the Exchange ActP - which prohibits fraud in proxy solicitations.
In J.I. Case Co. v Borak, ' the Court recognized an implied cause of action
for rescission or damages stemming from the use of a false and misleading
proxy statement.s5 The Court reasoned that, because Section 14(a) was
intended principally to protect investors, the availability of judicial relief
must be implied to achieve that result.' Also, private enforcement of the
proxy rules was necessary to supplement the activities of the SEC and to
further the congressional purpose of protecting investors from fraudulent
proxy matenals.87
In a more recent case, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v Sandberg,8" the
Court reaffirmed implied actions under the proxy rules in an action by share-
81. See Exchange Act, § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1994) (requiring that all
broker-dealers registered with SEC join NASD); see also NASD By-laws, Schedule C,
NASD Manual (CCH) 1785 (1994) *(requiring that all persons associated with member of
NASD must pass certain qualification and testing requirements).
82. See Rolf v Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.) (concluding
that, at least where fiduciary duty is owed to defrauded party, reckless behavior satisfies
scienter requirement), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Bozsi Ltd. Partnership v Lynott,
676 F Supp. 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that proof of reckless conduct generally
satisfies scienter requirement).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
84. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
85. See J.I. Case Co. v Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
86. See id.
87 See id.
88. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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holders for damages.8 9 In that case, the Court held that a false statement of
reasons, opinion, or belief is a statement "with respect to material facts"
that is actionable and that such statements may be misleading.' Although
the case involved an expression of views by a public company with regard
to a proposed merger, the holding could cover stock recommendations by a
securities salesperson and provide the basis for an application of the shingle
theory under the antifraud provisions.
The general test for determining whether a private right of action should
be applied under a federal statute was enumerated in a nonsecurities law
case, Cort v Ash.9 1 In this case, the Court set forth a four-part test to
determine whether a private action for damages should be unplied: (1) Is the
plaintiff one of the class of persons for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted? (2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
to create such a remedy or to deny one? (3) Is an implied remedy consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme? and (4) Is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law so that a federal claim would
be mappropriate?'
Almost immediately, the Court began applying the Cort test to various
provisions of the federal securities laws in order to deny liability In Piper
v Chns-Craft Industnes, Inc.,93 the Court held that a tender offeror does not
have standing to bring a private action for damages under Section 14(e) of
the Exchange Act94 against either a competing tender offeror, the target
company, or an investment banker.9' The Court observed that implying a
private remedy would not be necessary to effectuate Congress's purposes in
enacting Section 14(e). 96 That provision was intended for the especial bene-
fit of shareholders of target companies and not for those the statute was
designed to regulate.' Further, the Court backed away from its rationale in
Borak, stating that the SEC's institutional limitations alone cannot justify the
creation of a new cause of action not contemplated by Congress.9
89 See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1087 (1991) (referring
to existence of § 14(a) private action).
90. Id. at 1091-95.
91. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
92. Cort v Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
93. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
95. See Piper v Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
96. See id. at 29-35.
97 See rd. at 41.
98. See id.
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Then, in Touche Ross & Co. v Redington,9 the Court found no right
of action on behalf of creditors of a failed brokerage firm against an auditor
for alleged usstatements in a required annual report of the broker's finan-
cial condition. The Court held, among other things, that Section 17(a) of the
Exchange Act, 'I pursuant to which the report was required to be filed with
the SEC, was not for the especial benefit of customers of the firm.101 The
Court emphasized the lack of expressed congressional intent to create a new
cause of action."m It is noteworthy that this case involved allegations of neg-
ligence against a secondary tortfeasor.
In cases involving regulated securities industry entities, the Court has
been more inclined to imply causes of action under federal statutes. In
Transamenca Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis," a case charging an invest-
ment advisor with fraud, the Court held that a provision of the Investment
Advisors Act 4 - to the effect that contracts made m violation of that statute
are void'0 5 - not only evidenced a congressional intent for courts to imply
an equitable cause of action for rescission, but also for an ijunction against
continued operation of the contract and restitution.0" Also, in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Curran,"° the Court upheld, in a 5-4
decision, an implied right of action against a securities, firm under the
Commodity Exchange Act.0 8 The Court reasoned that, when Congress
enacted this statute in 1974, implied rights of action for fraud were routinely
recognized m the lower federal courts."°
Two issues are relevant to whether customers of broker-dealers can
prosecute damage actions under the shingle theory- whether private claims
can be implied under antifraud provisions other than Section 10(b) of the
99. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1994).
101. See Touche Ross & Co. v Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
102. See id. at 570-73.
103. 444 U.S. 11 (1979); see also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v Fox, 464 U.S. 523
(1984).
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1994).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 8b-15(b) (1994). Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(b) (1994), contains a sunilar provision. See Mills v Electric Auto-Life Co., 396 U.S.
375, 387 (1970) (noting that § 29(b) is counterpart to § 215(b)).
106. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
107 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
108. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82
(1982).
109. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 379.
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Exchange Act, and whether breach of SRO rules is a basis for a Rule 10b-5
action. The Supreme Court has not decided whether claims can be inplied
under either Section 17(a) of the Securities Act or Section 15(c)(1) of the
Exchange Act, both of which could be the basis for liability under the
shingle theory Cases decided m the lower courts are not entirely consistent,
but seem to point away from the implication of such causes of action.
In In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litiga-
tion,n10 the Ninth Circuit declined to imply a claim against 200 sellers of
defaulted municipal bonds under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act."' The
Court found no evidence of congressional intent for creating such a civil
action even though the plaintiffs might be members of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was passed.112 Although there are older Second
and Seventh Circuit cases that concluded that a private right of action could
be implied under Section 17(a),"' the more recent trend is to the contrary,
even m those circuits.1
4
Authority concerning whether a private right of action can be implied
under Section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act is sparse. In Roberts v Smith
Barney, Hams Upham & Co., l"' a district court declined to imply such a
claim on the ground, among others, that Section 10(b) was a broader section
intended to subsume possible claims under section 15(c)(1). n 61 In view of
recent Supreme Court cases, this rationale may no longer be valid.
Whether an action for violation of SRO rules can be the sole basis for
a Rule 10b-5 claim is problematic. In two cases from the 1960s, the Second
and Seventh Circuits recognized actions for violations of the "know your
110. 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
111. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th
Cir. 1987).
112. See id.
113. See Kirshner v United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding § 17
sufficiently broad to imply private right of action); Sanders v John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d
790, 796 (7th Cir. 1977) (assuming there could be an implied claim if scienter existed).
114. See Finkel v Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that
there is no private right of action under § 17(a)); Sears v Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th
Cir. 1990) (holding that §17(a) does not imply private right of action); see also Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1069-71.
115. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 93,293, at 96,474 (D.C.
Mass. 1986).
116. Roberts v Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 93,293, at 96,474 (D.C. Mass. 1986); see also Corbey v Grace, 605
F Supp. 247, 250-51 (D. Minn. 1985) (noting that protections provided by § 15(c)(1) are all
subsumed within provisions of § 10(b)).
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customer rule," an nportant concept under the shingle theory 117 However,
following recent Supreme Court decisions curtailing civil liability and re-
quiring such elements as scienter m Rule 10b-5 cases, more recent decisions
have suggested that breach of an SRO rule will not suffice for a Rule 10b-5
claim unless the elements of such a cause of action can be proven."' Never-
theless, SRO rules may be considered in measuring a broker-dealer's duty
of care. 119
Much of the Supreme Court's hostility to expansive interpretations of
Rule 1Ob-5 have been due to a reluctance to hold aiders 'and abettors liable
for the wrongs of primary tortfeasors. With respect to broker-dealers, the
controlling person provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
impose liability upon them for violations of their employees in actions under
the express civil liability provisions.' 2" For a number of years, the circuits
were split on whether liability also could be imposed under a theory of
respondeat supenor 121 However, after the Supreme Court's decision in
Central Bank v First Interstate Bank," there is a serious question as to
whether liability against a broker-dealer employer can be predicated on a
respondeat supenor theory
117 Buttrey v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th
Cir.) (holding that violation of NYSE Rule 405 is actionable, as rule's purpose is in accord
with federal statute), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v Bache &
Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.) (stating that when rule creates duty unknown to common
law, federal liability is more likely to be implied), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
118. See In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
breach of disclosure rule cannot serve as evidence of material misstatements or omissions);
Spicer v Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 266 (7th Cir. 1992). But see
Cook v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 726 F Supp. 151, 156 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that
private cause of action can be implied for violations of Rule 405).
119. See Hoxworth v Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200 (3d Cir. 1990)
(noting that violations of NASD rules may be probative m demonstrating course of conduct
amounting to fraud); Miley v Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that rules are useful tools to measure reasonableness of excessiveness of broker's
behavior).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994) (imposing liability on controlling persons); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (1994) (same).
121. Compare Campbell v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,082, at 91,413 (N.D. fI1. 1985) (finding
prima facie claim established for secondary liability of corporation for agent) and Plunkett
v Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F Supp. 885, 889 (D. Conn. 1976) (holding that respon-
deat superior doctrine was sufficient to survive motion to dismiss) with Altshul v Paine
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F Supp. 591, 595 (S.D.N.Y 1981) (finding respondeat
superior inapplicable against firms where alleged agent was, in effect, agent of plaintiffs).
122. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
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IV Possible Shingle Theory Liability Under Sections 12(2)
and 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act
The federal securities laws contain an elaborate scheme of remedies for
injured investors. Section 12(1) of the Securities Act provides that any per-
son who offers or sells a security in violation of the registration provisions
of Section 5 shall be liable to the person purchasing the security from him. '2
Section 12(2) provides that any person who offers or sells a security by
means of a prospectus or oral communication that contains an untrue fact or
fraudulent omission shall be liable to the person purchasing the security from
him. l2 4 Section 1l(a) of the Securities Act provides that any person who
acquires a security pursuant to a registration statement containing an untrue
statement of a material fact or an omission of a material fact may sue every
signer of the registration statement, every director or partner, every consent-
ing expert, and every underwriter."' s In addition, controlling persons are
made liable under Sections 11 and 12 by reason of the operation of Sec-
tion 15 of the Securities Act."
In Pinter v Dahl,'2 the Supreme Court narrowed the category of possi-
ble defendants in Section 12(1) of the Securities Act.'I The Court found
that only those who solicit a buyer of securities may be regarded as "sellers"
for purposes of Section 12(1). l 9 Pinter has been interpreted to apply in
case arising under Section 12(2)"3 and to eliminate the liability of collateral
participants in securities frauds such as lawyers who prepare false and is-
leading disclosure documents. 13
In Gustafson v Alloyd Co., 3 2 the Supreme Court's penchant for re-
stricting civil liability under the securities laws resulted in a dracoman limita-
tion on the parameters of Section 12(2). 133 Gustafson involved the sale of all
of the issued and outstanding stock of Alloyd Co. by three shareholders to
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994).
127 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
128. Pinter v Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-47 (1988).
129. Id. at 647
130. Wilson v Saintme Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.
1989).
131. See id. at 1126-27
132. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
133. See Gustafson v Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1072-73 (1995).
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a linuted number of purchasers.TM Prior to Gustafson, several circuits had
embraced the view that Section 12(2) does not apply to secondary market
transactions."5 However, in Gustafson, the Court went much further and
held that Section 12(2) does not apply to private placements.136 This raises
a serious question as to whether Section 11 liability attaches to secondary
market transactions.137 Further, it appears that, in shingle theory cases not
involving the sale of a registered security, customers defrauded by a broker-
age firm have recourse only under implied causes of action.
If no liability can be implied under Section 10(b), the only other likely
antifraud provisions are Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 15(c)
of the Exchange Act.138 Aaron v SEC 39 involved an action brought by the
SEC for an injunction against a broker-dealer's managerial employee for
negligently supervising sales personnel who were making false representa-
tions about an issuer whose securities the firm was recommending." In
Aaron, the Supreme Court addressed whether scienter is required in an
action under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.141 After Ernst & Ernst v
Hochfelder,'2 there had been some debate as to whether the SEC was
required to prove scienter in its cases, even if private parties had to prove
scienter in actions under Rule lOb-5. The dissent in Aaron adopted the view
that the SEC should not have to prove scienter under either of these antifraud
provisions, 143 but the majority took another tack.
The Court distinguished Section 17(a)(1), holding that actions under this
provision require proof of scienter, from Sections 17(a)(2) and (3), finding
that proof of scienter is not required under these provisions.'" According
to the Court, the plain language of the statute draws a distinction between
134. Id. at 1064.
135. First Union Discount Brokerage Servs., Inc. v Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44 (1 1th
Cir. 1993); Ballay v Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
136. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1072-73.
137 See Judith Welcom & Elizabeth Lynch, After 'Gustafson' Does Section 11 Apply
Only to IPOs?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1995, at 1, 4.
138. For the relevant text of § 17(a) of the Securities Act and § 15(c) of the Exchange
Act, see supra notes 10 and 12, respectively
139. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
140. See Aaron v SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 682 (1980).
141. See id. at 686.
142. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
143. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 703-04.
144. See id. at 695-96.
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deceptive conduct and conduct that operates as a fraud. 145 The Court rea-
soned that "device," "scheme," and "artifice" m Section 17(a)(1) all connote
knowing or intentional practices, but that Section 17(a)(2), which prohibits
anyone from obtaining money or property "by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact," is devoid of any
suggestion of a scienter requirement."4 Similarly, Section 17(a)(3), which
makes it unlawful for any person "to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit,"
focuses on the effect of particular conduct on investors rather than upon the
culpability of the tortfeasor.147
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the contrast the Court makes
between Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act is a fascinating exercise m the arcane because Rule lOb-5 is
phrased similarly to Section 17(a). Because Section 10(b) is phrased differ-
ently, however, and simply prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance "14' in contravention of the SEC's rules, the Court essentially
invalidated the second and third clauses of Rule lOb-5; the Court held that
deception or manipulation was required for a Rule 10b-5 action, but not for
a Section 17(a)(2) or (3) action. This raises the interesting question of
whether scienter is required in an action under Sections 15(c)(1) or (2) of the
Exchange Act, which are phrased a little differently than either Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act or Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.149
Section 15(c)(1) prohibits broker-dealers from inducing securities
purchases or sales by means of "any manipulative, deceptive, or other
fraudulent device or contrivance."' Section 15(c)(2) further prohibits
broker-dealers from engaging in any "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipula-
tive act or practice, or mak[ing] any fictitious quotation[s]."15' Section
15(c)(1)(D) gives the SEC rulemaking power to define what devices or
contrivances are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent. "
Section 15(c)(2)(D) gives the SEC power to prescribe means reasonably
145. See id.
146. See id.
147 See id. at 696-97
148. For thetextof§ 10(b), see supra note 11.
149 Compare supra note 12 (providing text of § 15(c)(1)-(2)) with supra note 10
(outlining text of § 17(a)) and supra note 11 (delineating text of § 10(b)).
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designed to prevent such acts and practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative. 1
3
The SEC drafted a broad definition of broker-dealer fraud in
Rule 15cl-2 that includes "any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person," as well
as "any untrue statement of a material fact and any omission to state a
material fact. "," In addition, the rules under Section 15(c) prohibit in detail
specific practices that lead to overreaching of customers and form compo-
nents of the shingle theory "' Although the Supreme Court could invalidate
these various rules using Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder 6 as a precedent and
interpret Sections 15(c)(1) and (2) as narrowly as Section 10(b), one would
hope that the Court would give some deference to the SEC's expertise and
authority to regulate the securities industry and not effect such a wholesale
excision of prohibited broker-dealer conduct from the statute and the
regulations.
Because it is unlikely that private damage actions would be miplied
under either Section 17(a) of the Securities Act or Sections 15(c)(1) or (2)
of the Exchange Act, the opportunities for the Supreme Court to address
these issues in the context of a shingle theory case are slim. Nevertheless,
equitable remedies might be implied under Transamerica Mortgage Advis-
ors, Inc. v Lewis. " Even in cases in which the conduct of a broker is so
egregious that a Rule 10b-5 case would be established, compulsory securities
industry arbitration agreements assure that most such cases will not be
litigated in the courts.
V Collateral Developments
A. Securities Industy Arbitration
Disagreements between member firms of the NYSE and between
member firms and their employees must be submitted to NYSE arbitration.5 I
Such arbitration facilities are of long standing, dating back to 1872, "1 and
were designed to maintain public confidence in the NYSE by keeping
153. See rd.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2(a)-(b) (1995).
155. See d.
156. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
157 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
158. N.Y.S.E. Constitution, art. XI, § 1, 3 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1501 (Nov 1994).
159. See PHILIP J. HOBLIN, JR., SECURiTIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES,
CASES 1-2 (2d ed. 1992).
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disputes between members confidential. It also is customary for securities
firms to require their customers to sign predispute arbitration agreements.
The validity of predispute arbitration agreements was questionable until
1987 when the Supreme Court held that an Exchange Act provision pro-
hibiting the waiver of substantive obligations under the statute did not mvali-
date such agreements.'O This decision seriously undermined an earlier
contrary holding under the Securities Act,'6' but in 1989 the Supreme Court
overruled that contrary holding. 62 Accordingly, today most disputes be-
tween customers and broker-dealers are determined in arbitration facilities
maintained by the NYSE or other SROs.' 63
One of the Supreme Court's reasons for permitting predispute arbitra-
tion clauses to be enforced, despite the superior bargaining power of broker-
dealers and the investor protection questions raised, is that the SEC's over-
sight of SROs serves to ensure the adequacy of their arbitration procedures
and facilities from a customer protection perspective. " .Somewhat per-
versely, however, the circuits have ruled that a customer may elect to
arbitrate disputes before the American Arbitration Association. 65 Securities
class actions, however, may not be arbitrated. 166
As a result of these developments, customers have brought relatively
few court cases against broker-dealers since 1987, a time during which the
Supreme Court's doctrinal development of Rule lOb-5 has been changing
rapidly Further, breach of SRO standards is an appropriate claim m an
SRO arbitration. In an important recent case, the Supreme Court held that
punitive damages could be awarded in an SRO arbitration involving cus-
tomers and broker-dealers.' 67 This case again demonstrates that the Supreme
Court has less solicitude for broker-dealers than for other defendants in
securities law actions.
160. Shearson/American Express Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987).
161. Wilko v Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953).
162. Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480
(1989).
163. Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REV
1113, 1114 (1993).
164. Shearson/Amencan Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 233-34.
165. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 113
(2d Cir. 1990); PaineWebber, Inc. v Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1990).
166. N.Y.S.E. Rule 600(d), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2600 (Nov 1992); N.A.S.D.
Code of Arbitration Procedure § 12(d), N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 3712; Katsoris, supra
note 163, at 1122.
167 Mastrobuono v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995).
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B. Securities Reform Legislation
The currently pending Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
would add an express right of action to the Exchange Act and, thus, replace
the implied actions previously brought under Rule lOb-5. 6s To some extent,
tis legislation would codify the cases discussed m this article, but additional
changes to the law would be made. Very importantly, the pending legisla-
tion would make "recklessness" a requisite for an action under Rule lOb-5. 
1 69
In crafting this legislation, Congress has focused primarily on curtailing
litigation against public companies and accountants, but securities industry
representatives have played a role in this effort. 70
How much, if any, attention has been given to the future of the shingle
theory m cases between broker-dealers and customers is not apparent.
Because most of these cases are likely to be arbitrated, this is perhaps an
issue of more theoretical than practical interest, especially because arbitra-
tion is a business forum, not a court of law, and arbitrators need not follow
legal precedent.' Nevertheless, legal standards under the securities laws
are important in SRO arbitrations."
V. Analysis and Conclusion
The shingle theory requires that broker-dealers deal fairly with their
customers. It embodies the notion that broker-dealers impliedly represent
168. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). House Bill 1058 passed the House of
Representatives on March 8, 1995. The Senate amended H.R. 1058 to contain provisions
from the parallel Senate bill, S. 240, 104th Cong., ist Sess. (1995). On June 28, 1995, the
Senate passed the amended version of H.R. 1058.
169. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation Reform: An Agenda for the Senate,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 23, 1995, p. 5, col. 1 (discussing bill generally). The standard for reckless-
ness as an extreme departure from ordinary standards of care that was set forth in Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977),
could be relevant in a shingle theory case.
170. See Jane Fritsch, Securities-Bill Staff Has Ties to the Industry, N.Y TIMES, May
25, 1995, at Al.
171. See DANNY ERTEL & RALPH C. FERRERA, BEYOND ARBITRATION § 2.14, at 44
(1991) (citation omitted); Panel Discussion on Non-Attorney Representation (Dec. 5, 1994),
in New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63
FORDHAM L. REV 1495, 1608 (1995).
172. See James A. Fanto, Justice Blackmun and Securities Arbitration: McMahon Re-
visited, 71 N.D. L. REV 145, 163-65 (1995). Compelled arbitration between broker-dealers
and their customers has been controversial because of the customer protection issues in-
volved. Id. at 165. However, SEC oversight of SROs and their arbitration facilities tends
to ensure that there will be accountability to customers, id. at 161 n.72, and that shingle
theory concepts will remain applicable.
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that they will deal fairly, but this implied representation is really a legal
fiction. At bottom, the shingle theory rests on the premise that a broker-
dealer has fiduciary obligations to its customers. When a broker acts as an
agent, such an obligation is generally consonant with an agent's common-law
dunes. However, the shingle theory arose in cases in which a securities firm
was acting as a dealer or a principal, and not as an agent, selling stock to
customers from inventory at unfair pnces. 73 In suitability and other types
of shingle theory cases, it is equally likely that a broker-dealer has been
selling stock as a dealer rather than acting as a broker. Because securities
firms operate in this dual capacity, their legal relationship with customers is
confused if the courts insist on forcing the relationship between broker-
dealers and customers to fit into the common-law categories of agent,
fiduciary, or arm's-length bargainer.
The SEC and the SROs have gone beyond the common law in formu-
lating the shingle theory and in applying it to both agency and principal
transactions. The question addressed by this article is whether the Supreme
Court would do the same in actions for damages by customers against their
broker-dealers under Rule lOb-5 or other antifraud provisions under the
Securities Act or the Exchange Act.
As a theoretical matter, the answer would seem to be "no." First, the
only section of the statute pursuant to which aggrieved customers currently
can sue is Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The Court apparently will not
apply Section 12(2) of the Securities Act to secondary market transactions,
and most lower courts do not believe that there are implied claims under
either Section 17(a) of the Securities Act or Section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange
Act. Second, actions under Rule lOb-5 require scienter or at least reckless-
ness and, further, are not available for breaches of state law fiduciary duty
In the more egregious shingle theory cases, alleging at least recklessness
is not an insurmountable problem. However, the shingle theory is more like
a common-law duty than a statutory standard. In the case of the duty of
directors to shareholders, the Supreme Court has refused to incorporate state
corporation law into Rule lOb-5 Would it treat the relationship between
broker-dealers and customers differently9 One could argue that the main
purposes of the federal securities laws were to regulate the securities mar-
kets, to regulate the securities industry, and to create the SEC to be the
policeman of Wall Street. Further, since the 1975 Amendments to the Ex-
change Act, all SRO rules or rule changes, as well as SRO disciplinary
cases, are approved or disapproved by the SEC. A holding that the shingle
173. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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theory is not a federal standard for broker-dealers but rather a state law
fiduciary duty standard would therefore be highly anomalous. Yet, the
Supreme Court is generally hostile to securities fraud actions for damages,
and most lower courts recently have held that plaintiffs must plead all
standard elements of a Rule lOb-5 action for a shingle theory case (for
example, a suitability case) to remain m the federal courts.
The likelihood of the Supreme Court grappling with these issues is
remote because most cases between broker-dealers and customers now are
relegated to arbitration. Further, securities reform legislation could substi-
tute a specific right of action under Rule lOb-5 for the current implied right
of action, thus generating years of litigation to determine the parameters of
this new type of case.
If the federal courts refuse to recognize shingle theory cases under the
federal antifraud rules, there would be an increase in such litigation m the
state courts. However, compelled *SRO arbitration makes such a develop-
ment unlikely Because arbitration decisions are not like court decisions and
the law applied is often unclear, the burden of developing the law under the
shingle theory is placed upon the SROs and the SEC in disciplinary
proceedings.
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